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Abstract
Across three studies, we test the hypothesis that the perceived ‘‘humanness’’ of a human face can have its roots, in part, in lowlevel, feature-integration processes typical of normal face perception—configural face processing. We provide novel evidence
that perceptions of humanness/dehumanization can have perceptual roots. Relying on the well-established face inversion paradigm, we demonstrate that disruptions of configural face processing also disrupt the ability of human faces to activate concepts
related to humanness (Experiment 1), disrupt categorization of human faces as human (but not animal faces as animals;
Experiment 2), and reduce the levels of humanlike traits and characteristics ascribed to faces (Experiment 3). Taken together, the
current findings provide a novel demonstration that dehumanized responses can arise from bottom-up perceptual cues, which
suggests novel causes and consequences of dehumanizing responses.
Keywords
face perception, configural processing, dehumanization, mind perception
Ascribing personhood to, or withholding personhood from,
another human is perhaps the most essential act of social cognition (Dennett, 1996). The consequences of ascribing or withholding humanity are extraordinary. Ascribing humanity brings
others into the moral community (Opotow, 1990), forestalling
harmful treatment, and facilitating fairness and empathy
(Čehajić, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009), whereas withholding
humanity leads to the converse. Dehumanization can trigger
discrimination (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009) and aggression
(Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). Moreover, when humanity is
withheld, persons are not ascribed the full human range of
emotions (Leyens et al., 2003). Perhaps not surprisingly, the
tendency to withhold humanity from others can facilitate intergroup conflict and harmful treatment (Haslam, 2006, 2014).
Despite major developments in theory on dehumanization and
related phenomena (infrahumanization, objectification, and mind
perception; see Bain, Vaes, & Leyens, 2014), most recent work
focuses on ascribing personhood as a motivated, top-down process, with beliefs and motives about the self and others influencing ascriptions of humanness. In the current work, we link the
ascription of humanity to bottom-up perceptual processes—we
demonstrate that ascribing humanity to others can also have its
roots in the perceptual processes employed in normal face encoding. We hypothesize that configural face processing, a featureintegration process typically reserved for the faces of in-group
members (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; Michel, Rossion, Han,
Chung, & Caldara, 2006; see also Ratner & Amodio, 2013), may

serve as a trigger for ascriptions of humanity: When a face is
processed configurally, it is experienced as more human.

Dimensions of Humanness: Ascribing and Withholding
Humanity
Although the consequences of dehumanization are troubling,
the cognitive processes underlying ascribing and withholding
personhood have only recently received scrutiny. Whereas a
review of the theories of ascribing humanlike faculties is
beyond the scope of the current work (see Haslam, 2014), there
is some consistency in how multiple research traditions—
including the infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2000), dehumanization (Haslam, 2006), and mind perception (Waytz, Gray,
Epley, & Wegner, 2010) literatures—explain ascriptions of
humanity. These perspectives focus on how humans are seen
as possessing sophisticated capacities that are distinct from
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other animals (e.g., dogs), while having an emotional responsiveness and experiential capacity that makes humans distinct
from objects such as automata or machines. This distinction
between ‘‘unthinking’’ animals and ‘‘unfeeling’’ machines is
reflected in how people are dehumanized. Humans seen as
being emotionally responsive and socially engaged but lacking
rationality, morality, and civility are seen as animallike,
whereas humans seen as rational and civil but lacking emotional responsiveness are seen as machinelike (Loughnan &
Haslam, 2007). Importantly, ascriptions of humanity are sensitive to top-down factors, such as intergroup motives (Hackel,
Looser, & Van Bavel, 2014), motives for social connection
(Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Powers, Worsham, Freeman, Wheatley, & Heatherton, 2014), or motives to derogate
others (Haslam, 2014).
Here, we propose that signals of others’ humanness can also
arise from the bottom-up perceptual process of configural face
encoding. The possibility that perceptual or bottom-up effects
influence the perception of personhood is largely absent from
most models of dehumanization and receives little discussion
in well-established models of mind perception. Indeed, only
recently have scientists begun to investigate how faces trigger
the experience that others are human (see Looser & Wheatley,
2010). In the current work, we predict that perceptual processes
employed in face perception can generate just such signals of
humanity, illustrating not just that bottom-up effects can occur
but also a specific process by which they emerge: configural
face processing.

Configural Processing of Faces
Faces are special. Humans process faces in a manner dissimilar
from virtually all other stimuli by integrating the individual
features of the face into a unified Gestalt, a process known as
configural face encoding (Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch,
2002).1 Objects and nonhuman faces are not processed configurally in most situations (Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997). This
integration of facial (but not object) features into a single
Gestalt can help explain why humans have relative ease recognizing human faces (Tanaka & Gordon, 2011).
Various techniques have been used to investigate configural
face processing, but the gold standard in the scientific literature
is the face inversion technique (see Figure 1). In Yin’s (1969)
groundbreaking demonstration, face inversion undermined
memory for faces but not for nonface objects such as aircraft
and houses. Inverting a face maintains the features in the face
(the eyes, nose, and mouth still exist) but disrupts the eyesover-nose-over-mouth configuration of the features, making
it well suited to isolate the effects of configural processing
(Rossion & Gauthier, 2002; Valentine, 1988).
Therefore, we relied on face inversion to manipulate configural processing in this research. This paradigm affords multiple
advantages, not the least of which is that it is the best-validated
means of manipulating configural face processing. It also
affords the advantage of disrupting configural processing without actually disrupting the features of the face itself (cf.
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Figure 1. Upright but not inverted faces are processed configurally.

scrambled features or composite face techniques; see Richler,
Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011; Zhao et al., 2014). Although such
techniques do manipulate configurality, scrambling features
and splitting a face also disrupt its humanness. Humans do not
exist with eyes where a chin should be, and humans with a
bifurcated skull are lacking key components of humanness
(e.g., their life). However, an inverted human is still, logically
speaking, fully human.

Configural Face Processing as a Cue for Humanity
Although the act of ascribing or withholding humanlike capacities is multiply determined, we propose that these ascriptions
can have perceptual roots. Because no stimulus is more
uniquely human than the human face, and because the face is
a focal point in social cognition (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010),
we argue that face processing is inextricably bound with
humanness (see also Looser & Wheatley, 2010; Wheatley,
Weinberg, Looser, Moran, & Hajcak, 2011). Specifically,
because human faces are processed configurally, in a manner
distinct from other objects, we argue that configural processing
is strongly associated with humanity and may therefore serve as
a cue for humanity. Although to our knowledge there are no
direct tests of this hypothesis, there is converging indirect evidence that configural face processing may cue humanity and
conversely that a lack of configural face processing may trigger
dehumanization.
Dehumanized faces are not processed configurally. Multiple findings indicate, albeit indirectly, that faces of dehumanized
groups may not be processed configurally. First, while configural processing typically does occur for human faces, not all
human faces are processed configurally to the same extent.
Instead, different types of faces are afforded differential levels
of configural processing. First, only real but not fake human
faces sustain neural activity beyond early feature detection and
integration processes (see Wheatley et al., 2011). Further, one
consistent finding is that racial out-groups are afforded less
configural face processing than are racial in-groups (e.g.,
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Michel et al., 2006). Similarly, facially stigmatized individuals
may also elicit less configural face processing. Facial stigmas
attract visual attention to the specific stigmatizing feature
(feature-based processing; Madera & Hebl, 2012), which can
undermine perceivers’ ability to process the face (Ackerman
et al., 2009). Thus, our hypotheses begin with the observation
that configural processing is attenuated for racial out-groups
and for members of stigmatized groups—the very groups who
are likely to be dehumanized in naturalistic contexts (e.g., Goff,
Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008).
Second, research also supports the link between dehumanization and processing people as objects. For example, Harris
and Fiske (2006) demonstrated that the faces of stigmatized
groups elicit lowered levels of activation of the medial prefrontal cortex, a brain region that mediates social judgments
(Harris, McClure, Van den Bos, Cohen, & Fiske, 2007).
Recently, Bernard, Gervais, Allen, Campomizzi, and Klein
(2012) extended the link between person versus object processing and dehumanization to the objectification of women.
Using an inversion paradigm, they demonstrated that sexualized women were processed more like objects and less like
humans, as compared to sexualized men. Although this work
uses bodies rather than faces, Bernard and colleagues’ evidence does demonstrate that objectified women are not processed like people typically are.
Configural processing triggers ascriptions of humanity. There is also
indirect evidence across disciplines that configural face
processing may trigger ascriptions of humanity. Making nonhuman stimuli appear facelike spontaneously elicits ascriptions of humanlike traits to those stimuli (Epley et al.,
2007). This tendency for facelike stimuli to be anthropomorphized has been demonstrated in scientific literatures ranging
from robotics to consumer preferences. For example, robots
with facelike characteristics are typically ascribed more
humanlike traits than are robots without them (see Duffy,
2003). Further, manipulations that disrupt configural processing of robot faces also interfere with the anthropomorphism of
robots. Osawa, Matsuda, Ohmura, and Imai (2010) found that
robots with a facelike configuration were visually scanned
like faces typically are (with a joint focus on eyes and mouth),
whereas inverted face orientation directed participants’ gaze
toward the mouth of the robot (i.e., feature-based processing).
This is an important observation, given that eyes appear
important in generating perceptions of animacy (Looser &
Wheatley, 2010), in triggering configural processing (Young,
Slepian, Wilson, & Hugenberg, 2014), and in generating
superior face encoding (Kawakami et al., 2014).
In consumer research, generating facelike product stimuli
also appears to elicit spontaneous anthropomorphic responses.
For example, the front end of automobiles, which commonly
resembles faces—headlights mapped to eyes and grills mapped
to mouths—elicit responses similar to faces. Headlight-to-grill
relationships resembling mature faces elicit anthropomorphized trait inferences of power relative to headlight-to-grill
relationships resembling immature faces (Windhager et al.,
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2012). In short, when nonhuman stimuli are presented having
facelike configurations, they elicit spontaneous anthropomorphizing responses.
Current research. In the current research, we directly investigate how configural face processing can trigger ascriptions
of humanity. When faces are processed configurally, we propose that this can trigger the activation of human-related concepts, facilitate the categorization of targets as human, and
even lead perceivers to believe an individual has more humanlike characteristics. Conversely, when that typical method of
processing faces is disrupted, we hypothesize that this may
fail to trigger the experience of ‘‘humanness,’’ leading to
(relative) dehumanization of others.

Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed as an initial test of the hypothesis
that disrupting configural face processing can disrupt the activation of concepts related to humanity. In this experiment, participants completed a modified lexical decision task (LDT). In
each trial, participants first saw a face presented either upright
or inverted for 100 ms, followed immediately by a letter string
that was either a word or a pronounceable nonword. Critically,
we manipulated within-subjects whether the words in the LDT
were related to humans or machines. Drawing on our hypothesis that configural face processing triggers humanness, we
predicted that upright faces, but not inverted faces, would facilitate recognition of human-related words but not machinerelated words or nonwords.

Method
Participants and Design
A power analysis using G*Power to detect a small effect (Z2p ¼
.02), assuming a .8 correlation between the measures targeted
an N of 52 for 95% power. Fifty-one White undergraduates
completed a study with a 3 (word type: human, machine, nonword)  2 (face prime orientation: upright, inverted) withinsubjects design.

Stimuli
Five grayscale images of the faces of White, college-aged
males displaying neutral expressions and direct gaze were presented either upright or inverted.2 Twelve words served as targets for the LDT. Six words related to humanity (human,
person, individual, soul, personality, and people) and six words
related to machines (machine, computer, robot, device, engine,
and locomotive) were used. These were matched across condition for average length (seven letters per word) and pretested on
a 7-point scale of relatedness to the concept ‘‘human’’ (1 ¼ not
at all and 7 ¼ very much). Pretesting (N ¼ 10) indicated that the
human-related words were more human related (M ¼ 6.07,
95% CI [5.57, 6.57], SD ¼ 0.80) than were the machinerelated words (M ¼ 1.82, 95% CI [1.43, 2.21], SD ¼ 0.63),
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t(9) ¼ 15.97, p < .001. We also employed 12 pronounceable
nonwords matched for average length with the words.

Human Words
700

Procedure
Participants completed a modified LDT via computer. This
task consisted of 192 trials. Each trial began with a fixation
cross (1,000 ms), which was occluded by a 100 ms face prime,
after which a letter string was presented. Letter strings
remained onscreen until participants responded. Participants
indicated whether the letter string presented was a word or nonword via keystroke, as quickly and accurately as possible. Face
prime orientation was manipulated within subjects, creating 96
upright face and 96 inverted face trials. Word type was also
manipulated within subjects, creating 96 word and 96 nonword
trials. In the 96 word trials, half of the words presented were
related to humans and half were related to machines.

Results and Discussion
Of interest was whether face inversion affected the activation
of human-related concepts but not machine-related concepts.
To test this, we first eliminated response latencies for incorrect
responses, latencies faster than 300 ms, and latencies slower
than 1,500 ms (10.2% of trials) based on a priori criteria (see
Boucher & Rydell, 2012). We then averaged response latencies
for the six different trial types of the 3  2 design, separately
for each participant.
Given that face inversion disrupts spontaneous configural
processing, of interest was whether inverted faces elicit slower
responses to human-related words (but not machine or nonwords), relative to upright faces. To investigate this, the
response latency data were submitted to a 3 (word type)  2
(face prime orientation) repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA). As shown in Figure 2, this ANOVA revealed the
predicted two-way interaction, F(2, 100) ¼ 3.48, p ¼ .035,
Z2p ¼ .065.
Decomposing this interaction separately for word type
indicates that, as predicted, human-related words were classified more quickly after upright face primes (M ¼ 586.08,
95% CI [567.90, 604.25], SD ¼ 64.62) than after inverted
face primes (M ¼ 602.12, 95% CI [582.37, 621.87], SD ¼
70.23), F(1, 50) ¼ 12.39, p ¼ .001, Z2p ¼ .199. However,
there was no effect of face prime orientation on machine
words, F(1, 50) ¼ 0.11, p ¼ .738, Z2p ¼ .002, or on nonwords,
F(1, 50) ¼ 0.13, p ¼ .717, Z2p ¼ .003. Alternately, decomposing the interaction separately for upright and inverted face
primes indicates that classification of human-related words
was facilitated relative to machine words in the upright,
F(1, 50) ¼ 14.11, p < .001, Z2p ¼ .22, but not the inverted
condition, F(1, 50) ¼ 0.85, p ¼ .36, Z2p ¼ .017. As is common
in LDTs, responses to human-related and machine words
(i.e., actual words) were faster than responses to nonwords
in both conditions, ps < .001.
Experiment 1 found that face inversion influences the activation of human-related words. Even brief exposures to upright

Machine Words
Non-Words

650

600

550

500

450

Figure 2. Lexical decision task response latency data from Experiment 1, and upright faces facilitate the activation of human-related
concepts but not machine-related concepts. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.

faces (faces that are spontaneously processed in a configural
manner) activated human-related words more so than did
inverted faces. Further, given the failure of face orientation
to influence response latencies to either machine words or nonwords, this is not easily explained by upright faces being processed more easily or inverted faces arresting attention,
which would predict a main effect of face orientation. Finally,
the fact that inverted faces elicit equivalent response latencies
for both human-related and machine words is telling. This indicates that inverted faces, at least in terms of early concept activation, may fail to differentially activate human- and objectrelated concepts.

Experiment 2
Experiment 1 supports the notion that processing human faces
configurally activated human-related concepts, relative to faces
that cannot be processed configurally. However, one reasonable counterargument to the findings of Experiment 1 is that
perhaps inverting any stimulus will make it less representative
of its category (e.g., inverting an apple makes it less applelike).
Experiment 2 was designed to conceptually replicate and
extend the findings of Experiment 1, while ruling out this alternative explanation. In Experiment 2, we sought to extend this
configural-to-humanity link to categorization, using a speeded
face categorization task. If the activation of human-related concepts is stronger for upright relative to inverted human faces,
then upright human faces should be more easily categorized
as human than their inverted counterparts. However, we also
predict that this inversion effect should have unique effects
on stimuli that are processed configurally—human faces—and
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not on stimuli that are not typically processed in a strongly configural manner (e.g., animal faces).
To test this hypothesis, participants completed a speeded
categorization task wherein they categorized human and chimpanzee faces, presented both upright and inverted, either
‘‘human’’ or ‘‘animal’’ as quickly and accurately as possible.
We hypothesized that inverting human faces would slow categorization of these faces as human because it disrupts the signal
of humanness generated by configural processing. The signal
of ‘‘animalness,’’ however, was not predicted to be generated
by configural face processing, presumably the signal of chimpness is easily extracted from cues other than configurality. Supporting this, Dahl, Rasch, and Chen (2014) found that only
own-species upright faces are afforded strong levels of configural processing, whereas inverted faces of all types (own- and
other-species faces) are processed piecemeal. Thus, inverting
nonhuman animals (including chimpanzee faces) should not
interfere with the ability to categorize them as animals.
We predicted an interaction of species and orientation in
categorization latencies. While face inversion was predicted
to disrupt the categorization of human faces as humans, face
inversion was not predicted to disrupt the categorization of
chimpanzee faces as animals.

Participants
A G*Power analysis using Z2p ¼ .065 (Experiment 1’s interaction effect size) and the same assumptions yields N ¼ 21.
Twenty-one White undergraduates completed a study with a
2 (face species: human, chimpanzee)  2 (face orientation:
upright, inverted) within-subjects design.

Procedure
Participants competed a speeded human versus animal categorization task for human and chimpanzee faces via computer.
Face species and orientation were manipulated orthogonally
across trials. Participants were presented with an equal number
of upright and inverted human and chimpanzee faces. The animal faces were grayscale images of 20 neutral expression
chimpanzees. The human faces were grayscale images of 20
neutral expression White males. Stimuli faced the camera, provided direct eye gaze, and were sized to approximately 200 
300 pixels.
Participants first completed 8 practice trials and then completed 80 experimental trials (20 upright and 20 inverted for
each face species). Faces were presented in a random order.
Trials began with a fixation cross (1,000 ms), followed by
either a human or a chimpanzee face, which remained onscreen
until participants categorized the face via keystroke. Reaction
times (RTs) were the primary dependent measure.

Results and Discussion
Of interest was whether inversion disrupted categorization of
human but not animal faces. To test this, we first calculated
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mean categorization latencies separately for each of the four
experimental conditions. Errors and RTs greater than 3 SDs
from participants’ mean were removed prior to analyses
(<1% of all trials; the exclusion rule changed across studies due
to the much faster RTs in Experiment 2).
Mean response latencies were submitted to a 2 (face species:
human, animal)  2 (face orientation: upright, inverted)
repeated-measures ANOVA. This ANOVA revealed main
effects of face species, F(1, 20) ¼ 8.17, p ¼ .01, Z2p ¼ .29, and
face orientation, F(1, 20) ¼ 6.72, p ¼ .017, Z2p ¼ .25. As predicted, these main effects were qualified by a Species  Orientation interaction, F(1, 20) ¼ 6.21, p ¼ .023, Z2p ¼ .24.
As shown in Figure 3, inversion slowed categorization of
human faces as human (M ¼ 449, 95% CI [371.59, 526.41],
SD ¼ 181) relative to upright human faces (M ¼ 383, 95%
CI [323.55, 442.45], SD ¼ 139), t(20) ¼ 2.83, p ¼ .01, d ¼
.69. However, for chimpanzee faces, orientation had no impact
on categorization times, t(20) ¼ 1.04, p > .3, d ¼ .09. Comparing across face species, upright human and chimp faces were
categorized with similar ease, t(20) ¼ 0.34, p ¼ .74, d ¼ .05,
whereas inversion slowed the categorization of human faces
relative to chimp faces, t(20) ¼ 3.42, p ¼ .003, d ¼ .45. Put
simply, human faces seem uniquely sensitive to orientation in
this species categorization task, with the categorization of
human faces being impaired by inversion. However, for the
chimp faces, categorization was not influenced by face orientation. Given the central role of face orientation in the configural
processing of human faces (Valentine, 1988; Yin, 1969), these
data provide consistent evidence that the configural processing
of human faces influences decisions about others’ humanity.
The design of Experiment 2 builds on the findings of
Experiment 1 in important ways. First, the concept activation
that was generated by configural face processing in Experiment
1 can have consequences for categorization. Although the relationship between categorization and activation was not tested,
concept activation constrains categorization (Freeman &
Ambady, 2011). Second, while Experiment 1 employed human
versus machine comparisons, Experiment 2 employed human
versus animal comparisons. Our model is agnostic as to
whether configurality triggers ‘‘uniquely human’’ or ‘‘human
nature’’ characteristics (Haslam, 2006, 2014). However, given
that well-established models rely on this distinction, it is noteworthy that the current work demonstrates that configurality
triggers humanness relative to both machines and animals.
Importantly, given that these data demonstrate unique
effects for human faces but not animal faces, they are not easily
explained away by arguing that changing the canonical orientation of stimuli in general reduces category accessibility. Were
this true, both human and chimpanzee faces should demonstrate sensitivity to the inversion effect. Given the interaction
demonstrating effects uniquely for the human face, this is
clearly not the case here. This argument is further bolstered
by the demonstration that upright chimp faces are not more difficult to categorize than human faces at baseline. This indicates
that this task is equivalently difficult for the familiar upright
orientation. Instead, the findings of Experiment 2 clearly
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Figure 3. Categorization latency data from Experiment 2, and face
inversion inhibits the categorization of human faces but not chimpanzee faces. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

indicate that configural processing is an effect specific to
human faces: Disrupting configural processing of human faces
disrupts the categorization of humans, an identical manipulation on structurally similar animal faces has no such effect on
categorization of animals.

Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 yield direct evidence that face orientation—a potent manipulation of configural face processing—
influences both concept activation and categorization of
humanness. Experiment 3 was designed to extend these effects
to a consequence of this spontaneous activation: the deliberate
ascription of humanlike characteristics. Specifically, participants rated upright and inverted human faces on a number of
traits indicative of humanness, taken from the mind perception
and dehumanization literatures. We hypothesized that inverted
faces would be rated as lower on these dimensions indicative of
humanness, relative to upright faces.

Method
Participants and Design
A G*Power analysis with the same assumptions as above
yields N ¼ 24 to achieve 95% power to detect moderatesized effects. Twenty-nine White undergraduates (17
women) participated for partial course credit. Face orientation (upright vs. inverted) was manipulated within subjects.
The dependent measure was average ratings on five traits
indicative of humanness.

participants then viewed 40 White male faces (20 upright and
20 inverted; see Experiment 2). Orientation was counterbalanced across face identity such that each face was equally
likely to be seen upright or inverted.
Participants indicated how thoughtful, empathetic, considerate, creative, and humanlike each face appeared on scales from
1 ¼ not at all to 7 ¼ very much. These five traits were selected
from a larger pool of traits that we extracted from relevant literature on dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) and mind perception (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007) and have been used in
other research investigating ascriptions of humanity (See &
Hugenberg, 2015). Each face was displayed at the center of the
screen for 500 ms, which was then occluded by a gray box for
250 ms, after which a trait appeared onscreen, along with the
rating scale. Participants rendered ratings via keystroke.

Results and Discussion
Of interest was whether face inversion influenced trait ratings
indicative of humanness. To test this, ratings were averaged
into separate upright and inverted means (Cronbach’s as >
.71), separately for each participant. Consistent with predictions, a paired samples t-test indicated that participants
ascribed significantly lower levels of humanlike traits to the
inverted faces (M ¼ 3.79, 95% CI [3.56, 4.02], SD ¼ 0.62) than
to the upright faces (M ¼ 4.05, 95% CI [3.84, 4.26], SD ¼
0.58), t(28) ¼ 3.83, p < .001, d ¼ .43.
This experiment provides evidence that even explicit ratings
of the humanness of faces were influenced by configural face
processing. Notably, the high reliability indicated that our
dimensions of humanness measure a unified construct; however, an analysis of even our most face valid dimension of
humanity—humanlike—yielded identical results: Upright
faces (M ¼ 5.34, 95% CI [4.86, 5.82], SD ¼ 1.25) were rated
as more ‘‘humanlike’’ than were inverted faces (M ¼ 5.05,
95% CI [4.55, 5.55], SD ¼ 1.31), t(28) ¼ 2.30, p ¼ .029,
d ¼ .23. Further, the fact that face inversion influenced explicit
ratings may seem somewhat surprising given that an inverted
face is still logically human. And yet, the data clearly indicate
that even trait ratings, which can be susceptible to attempts at
correction (Wegener & Petty, 1995), were influenced by face
inversion. Finally, given that the current stimuli are evaluatively positive, we collected additional data with a separate
sample of participants (N ¼ 36) who rated the faces on ‘‘attractiveness’’ to ensure the effects were not due to inversion affecting all positive dimensions. Upright faces (M ¼ 4.11, 95% CI
[3.74, 4.48], SD ¼ 1.09) and inverted faces (M ¼ 4.04, 95% CI
[3.69, 4.39], SD ¼ 1.04) were rated as equivalently attractive,
t(35) ¼ 0.64, p > .5, d ¼ .065, which is not consistent with a
valence explanation.

General Discussion
Procedure
Participants were instructed that people often show accuracy in
personalities ratings of others at zero acquaintance. All

Across three studies, we provided novel evidence that the activation of human-related concepts, the categorization of faces
as human, and the ascription of humanity were sensitive to face
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inversion, which reliably disrupts the spontaneous configural
processing typical of upright faces.
Whereas past research has focused on motivated processes
in deciding individuals and groups are fully human, the goal
of the current work was to demonstrate that the ascription of
humanness can have roots in purely perceptual processes.
Indeed, the premise that perceived humanness can be the product of bottom-up perceptual processes has received relatively
short shrift in the expanding literatures on ascriptions of
humanness and mind perception (see Epley et al., 2007; Looser
& Wheatley, 2010). Put simply, dehumanization can occur
above and beyond a stigmatized identity and for reasons other
than perceivers’ motivation to dehumanize others.
This work has connections to multiple literatures, including
work on autism, facial stigma, and face perception. First, autism is associated with both impairments in theory of mind
(Baron-Cohen, 1995) and abnormal face processing, including
failures to configurally process faces (Behrmann et al., 2006).
The impairments linked to autism share features of (mechanistic) dehumanization (Haslam, 2006), suggesting that theory of
mind deficits central to autism may be related to face processing. From our perspective, it may not be happenstance that
those with chronic inabilities to process the complex mental
states of others also have chronic inabilities to process faces
in a manner distinct from objects.
The current research can also inform literature on facial
stigma. Goffman’s (1963) seminal work on stigma included
so-called ‘‘abominations of the body’’ as primary type of
stigma, which can cause others to be ‘‘discredited’’ and treated
as less-than-human. Goffman’s original work placed special
focus on facial stigma (facial scarring and harelips). Given that
facial stigma often violate the typical configuration of features,
the stigmatizing nature of facial scarring may actually generate
from a violation of otherwise ‘‘normal’’ face perception processes (see also Young, Sacco, & Hugenberg, 2011). Thus, the
stigmatizing nature of facial scarring may be an emergent property of both bottom-up processes (configural violations) and
top-down processes (stereotypes).
Further, given that the current research has employed the
most commonly used manipulation of configural processing
in the face perception literature, this does broach the provocative question about whether some configural face effects
observed in the literature might be mediated by perceptions
of humanness. For example, in-groups are configurally processed more than out-groups (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009;
Michel et al., 2006). Given the findings that devalued social
groups are not processed as fully human (Harris & Fiske,
2006), this raises the possibility that this difference may be due,
in part, to differential perception of the groups as human.
Finally, the current work leaves open the question of why
configural face processing cues humanness. We see multiple
possibilities. First, it is possible that the configural–humanity
link is innate. Indeed, newborn infants attend to facelike configurations more so than inverted facelike configurations (Turati, Simion, Milani, & Umiltá, 2002), and this could occur in
part because of an innate link between configurality and
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animacy. Perhaps more likely is that people come to associate
configural processing with humanness. Indeed, if one typically
reserves configural processing for human faces, the configural–
human association is likely quickly learned and heavily reinforced. If so, this raises a provocative question: If perceivers
can be trained to configurally process nonhuman stimuli, will
perceivers anthropomorphize those stimuli? Past work has
demonstrated that, with sufficient perceptual expertise, perceivers can learn to process nonhuman stimuli configurally—bird
experts show facelike processing of birds (e.g., a facelike
neural response; see Gauthier et al., 2000). So do birders therefore anthropomorphize birds more than do nonexperts? Perhaps. However, electroencephalographic research suggests
that real human faces and humanlike doll faces are not distinguished until after the encoding stage when configural processing is thought to occur (Wheatley et al., 2011). Whether
configural processing is sufficient to generate a signal of
humanness without humanlike perceptual content, or whether
this is an interaction between configural processing and
human-specific facial content is an open question.

Conclusion
The current work provides clear, novel evidence that configural
face processing—a feature-integration process that distinguishes face from object perception—influences the activation,
categorization, and ascription of humanness. Configural face
processing is a perceptual gateway for perceptions of humanness and dehumanization: Perceiving faces as human depends
on configural processing.
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Notes
1. Following Maurer, Le Grand, and Mondloch (2002), we define holistic processing as a subset of configural processing.
2. Given the White participant population, we used same-race
(White) faces because race affects face perception (Hugenberg &
Wilson, 2013).
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